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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

1. Following the Soviet press release about the capture of CACCOLAS 10, 20, 21 into and 28 an ~~investigation~~ investigation was launched at CSOB ~~about~~ the possible causes of this capture. ~~As a result of the investigation, it was determined that~~ ~~the investigation was limited to an examination of the evidence provided by:~~ This memorandum consists largely of material abstracted from the full report on the investigation, which is available here at HQS.
2. The scope of the investigation was limited to an examination of the evidence provided by:
  - a. questioning of the KUBARK personnel in Frankfurt and Munich who participated in the CACCOLA B operation,
  - b. review of CACCOLA case-officer reports and various other materials dealing with the mounting of the operation,
  - c. questioning of the air crew and review of their report on the mission flight,
  - d. questioning and LOFLUTTERING of those CAPABLE 1 personnel directly involved in the CACCOLA project.
3. Excluding the possibility of accidental capture, about which speculation is useless, the investigation proceeded on the assumption that to effect the capture of all 4 agents within less than 48 hours of the drops ( as appears to have been the case), the Soviets ~~would~~ could have ~~had~~ taken the necessary action on the basis of the following kinds of information:
  - a. advance knowledge of the approximate time of dispatch,
  - b. advance knowledge of the two DZ's,
  - c. advance knowledge of the names used on the agents' documents, and
  - d. knowledge of the mission aircraft's course and the DZ's gained from the interpretation of electronic and visual/aural observation data.

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SECRET

4. Advance Knowledge of the Approximate Time of Dispatch.

There are two ways in which the RIS could have obtained such information: through an inside agent, or through external agent-observation of indications that a clandestine flight was forthcoming. The investigation, which included interrogation and LCFLUTTERING of all CAPABLE 1 members involved in the CACCOLA project, did not turn up any evidence ~~th~~ of internal betrayal. All of the CACCOLA B agents themselves were LCFLUTTERED shortly before dispatch and no reactions that could be interpreted as indicating betrayal of intention thereof were recorded. The interrogation and LCFLUTTERING of all the KUBARK personnel possessed of the above information was beyond the scope of the investigation. The investigation did establish, however, that security precautions at the dispatch field/ ~~Ex~~ in Athens were inadequate, that the use of the field in question was ill-advised, and that there were several ways in which the RIS could have deduced the approximate time of dispatch/ through external agent-observation.

5. ~~At~~ Advance Knowledge of the Two DZ's. ~~The only way in which~~ The

investigation established that the only way in which the Soviets could have gained advance knowledge of the two DZ's was through internal betrayal. The conclusions of the investigation were: "We do not believe that the agents themselves betrayed the DZ's, we have no indication that CAPABLE 1 personnel did, and as for the others (KUBARK personnel), we cannot say."

6. Advance Knowledge of the Document Names. In this case, a relatively limited number of people ~~knew~~ (not more than 12, excluding the agents) knew the document names since they were picked ~~up~~ on the spot by the project case officers and CAPABLE 1 instructors. The conclusions of the investigation were: "as far as we know, no agent knew any other

-3-  
SECRET

cleared by LCFLUTTER — but we can say nothing about the KUBARK personnel who knew the names.

7. Knowledge of the Mission Aircraft's Course and the DZ's gained from the Interpretation of electronic and visual/aural observation data.

Without going into the rather complex technical data examined by the investigation report, which included interrogation of the plane crew, analysis of the flight plan, and special intelligence data, suffice it to say that the investigation came to the conclusion that the Soviets "could have plotted the mission aircraft's course by aural/visual observation and determined the DZ's by the correct interpretation of electronic monitoring reports."

8. Conclusions of the Investigation. After an examination of the various measures the MVD could have taken on the basis of the information they could have obtained as indicated above, the ~~investigat~~ investigation report comes to the following conclusions:

"If the DZ areas were not fully alerted because the Soviets either knew them to be DZ areas through internal betrayal or, as seems more likely, had inferred that they were DZ areas through the interpretation of radar pickup data, they were at least partially alerted because of being along the mission aircraft's course. In view of the nature of the two DZ's, the circumstances of at least the second drop and the likely delay of the agents in the Dz areas, a partial alert could probably have led to the rapid capture of the four agents, and a full and geographically-concentrated alert could certainly have led to it.

And thus, while the possibilities of capture as a result of internal betrayal or sheer chance cannot be excluded, our investigation compels us to conclude that, in all probability,

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the MVD was able to capture CACCOLAS 10,20,21, and 28 within 48 hours of their drops primarily because of its ability rapidly to interpret and exploit data gained from electronic and visual/aural observation of the missions aircraft's course.

As a corollary to our conclusion we suggest that the following factors contributed materially to the MVD's success:

- a. the use of unmarked aircraft,
- b. the fact that the agents were able to learn too much about each other's missions,
- c. the fact that, during the flight, the mission aircraft rode into possible radar range only at the two DZ's,
- d. the fact that the second drop was made in the rain with the ~~the~~ DZ invisible,
- e. the rugged topography of at least DZ #2, and
- f. the fact that the agents were briefed to remain as long as 48 hours in the DZ areas.

The extent to which these factors ~~contributed~~ actually contributed to the MVD's success cannot be judged. Whatever it was, however, the responsibility for it lies with KUBARK."

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